Monday, October 26, 2009

ASEAN Summit marred by controversy

Ren Yi Hooi, BASC Research Assistant

With the first ever ASEAN-US summit confirmed to take place in conjunction with the annual APEC Meeting in Singapore next month, ASEAN’s importance as a region appears to have gained further recognition on the global platform. However, sticky disputes over human rights issues and friction between some member nations threaten the grouping’s hopes to achieve a fully integrated Southeast Asian community by 2015.

On the first day of the ASEAN Summit 2009 in Hua Hin, Thailand, the inauguration of its new human rights body, the Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), was overshadowed by the barring of activists from a dialogue with Southeast Asian leaders and tension between the Thai and Cambodian prime ministers.

The summit began inauspiciously with the leaders of 5 countries – Philippines, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei – failing to arrive in time for the opening ceremony, causing several activists to walk out in protest to the perceived snub, and the states of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines and Singapore vetoing the activists meant to represent their own countries. Without the power to investigate governments or impose sanctions, in any case, AICHR has already been criticized as a body lacking “teeth”; one with more talk than substance. To add fuel to the fire, Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen compared Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra, the ousted Thai Prime Minister, to Ms Aung San Suu Kyi, the Burmese Nobel Peace Laureate, and declared that Mr Thaksin would be allowed to stay in Cambodia as his economic advisor.

Meanwhile, the region is still scrambling to solve a range of internal challenges, including a trade dispute between Thailand and Philippines, territorial disputes between Malaysia and Indonesia as well as the Philippines and Singapore, and conflicting claims to natural gas deposits in the South China Sea by Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines.

With such outstanding conflicts compounding the vast political and social differences between member states, ASEAN’s ambitions to create a single market by 2015 look set to be disappointed. Although it is indisputably one of the world’s fastest growing economic regions, what remains to be seen is the political leaders of ASEAN are 1) able to override individual disputes in order to facilitate greater regional cooperation and 2) willing to sink its “teeth” into globally scrutinized issues (i.e. human rights) in a manner that underscores action in addition to talk. It is only with the concerted will to resolve difficult issues for once and for all, that ASEAN will truly be able to integrate into a united global market that is attractive to the world.

Friday, October 9, 2009

Little Prospects for Japan’s Proposed “East Asian Community”

Peter Volberding, BASC Research Assistant

Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s recent proposal for an East Asian Community is expected to raise eyebrows at Saturday’s trilateral summit in Beijing between the leaders of Japan, China, and South Korea. Inspired by the successes of the European Union, Hatoyama’s prosaic vision aims to foster economic growth and ensure regional stability. But calls for greater Asian integration are nothing new, and are rarely successful—is this proposal any different? Probably not.

What is different is Japan’s interest in regional affairs. The LDP’s half century stranglehold over Japanese politics relied on a close relationship with Washington, often at the expense of Beijing or Seoul. Prime Minister Hatoyama’s sudden shift in foreign policy reflects his desire to reassess Japan’s relations with its neighbors. His promise to not visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine and his proposal for an East Asian Community, for example, are important first attempts at increasing rapport in Japan’s relations with China and South Korea.

However, the East Asian Community seems to be more about self-interest rather than repentance. The DPJ faces a stagnant domestic economy, and sees increased economic cooperation as a means to increase Japan’s economic growth potential. While the party has certainly prioritized improved international relations, this aim is most likely ancillary to domestic economic goals.

In addition, as many Chinese scholars have eagerly emphasized, this proposal was actually first promoted in the early 1990s—and it became ASEAN + 3. Why has Japan proposed yet another grouping? Japan desires to check China’s growing regional influence. In fact, Japan’s proposed East Asian Community not only includes the ASEAN + 3 nations, but also Australia, New Zealand, and India. This "ASEAN+6" grouping has already been in existence since 2005 in the form of the East Asia Summit (EAS), whose meetings have thus far produced little more than broad statements about energy cooperation. Japan’s not-so-secret intentions to balance China in the EAS have thus far tempered Chinese interest in the grouping, and China will have the same reaction to any East Asian Community consisting of this larger "+6" format.

Finally, the East Asian Community will ironically force Japan to address sensitive domestic issues. For example, a new economic community would undoubtedly pressure Japan to liberalize trade, reduce domestic farm subsidies, and ease restrictions on foreign laborers. Given the heavily entrenched interests of industry and agriculture, I am skeptical that the Japanese government will revisit these policies anytime soon.

If the current problems of the EU are any indication, the East Asian Community faces little prospect of succeeding. Enormous economic and political heterogeneity in Asia preclude any semblance to the European integration model. Furthermore, historical distrust is routinely manifested in public protests against Japan, reducing the likelihood that the Chinese and South Korean governments would agree to increased integration in the near future, even if the plan were advantageous for all parties.

While economic integration in Asia is an admirable idea, the East Asian Community is not a viable option. Deep-seated political suspicions will thwart discussions, and Prime Minister Hatoyama will leave Beijing empty-handed.

Tuesday, October 6, 2009

G-20 2009: Promise-Making in Pittsburgh

This week, three BASC Research Assistants take on the recent G-20 summit in Pittsburgh, examining issues of security, institutional change, and the environment.

Crashing the G-20 Party: Line in the Sand against Iran
Ivy Ngo, BASC Research Assistant

The opening statements at the G-20 Economic Summit wasted no time in addressing the revelation of a nuclear facility in Iran. “Iran is breaking the rules all nations must follow”, President Obama said, while Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced, “The international community has no choice today but to draw a line in the sand.” Iran’s refusal to accept fault-–it did, after all, report the facility itself to the International Atomic Energy Agency and maintains the facility is for nuclear energy and not atomic bombs–-has done little to assuage the international community. Even Russia and China, who have been known to hug the fence on global security issues, have condemned Iran’s actions. The ‘line in the sand’ creates two options for Iran: diplomacy or sanctions.

The reaction towards Iran has thus far been hard-line, with little room for negotiation. Could this reaction be too harsh? Headstrong North Korea and Cuba have both been under tough sanctions for decades now, and North Korea has also recently been posturing with its own nuclear development. During his time in office, former President George W. Bush made his well-known assessment of Iran as part of an ‘axis of evil’; the continued harsh attitude towards Iran could entrench it further. Iran’s adamant denial of wrongdoing is laced with resentment. The Iranian recently posted a short opinion piece asking why Iran is excluded from the G-20 considering that it ranks 17th among the top 20 economies, based on Purchasing Power Parity, in lists compiled by the IMF and World Bank.

With the G20 now becoming the central platform to discuss the global economy, it will be interesting to see how the international community reacts, and who will dominate the discussion. So far, the US has refused to engage in direct talks, opting for six party talks with Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany instead.

Institutional Shift: Rising Powers Gain Greater Voice in the G-20
Michelle Chang, BASC Research Assistant

At a time when nations around the world are struggling to climb out of the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression, the G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh is symbolic of first steps a new world economic order. Its emergence as the primary coordinating body of global economic issues signifies the increasingly undeniable importance of developing countries such as China and India and the need to provide these rising powers with fora in which they can exercise greater influence. Similarly, leaders of G-20 nations agreed to give greater voting power to developing countries within the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to make the institution more representative. At the moment, about 57% of the voting power in the IMF belongs to developed countries and 43% belongs to developing countries, and this shift will make the two groups about even. These actions are long overdue, but hopefully they represent the first of many steps necessary to bring our existing global institutional architecture in line with the changing realities of the international order.

The G-20 and the Environment: Vague Promises Draw Continued Criticism
Ren Yi Hooi, BASC Research Assistant

Despite reiterated promises to build a ‘greener’ economy, the G20 summit failed to propose a concrete set of actions to address environmental issues. While world leaders dedicated a total of $1.1trillion towards boosting the economic and financial crisis, there was no money set aside to protect the environment, disappointing environmental groups who criticized the ‘green effort’ as one characterized by “vague aspirations”. At the summit, leaders affirmed a 15-month-old commitment to put up a new climate treaty in December, pledged to “create green jobs” and resolved to "accelerate the transition" to a low-carbon economy. However, these were seen as inadequate repetitions of old ideas by environment experts and lobbyists, who had wanted to see solid figures and stronger message to re-build a leaner economy run on wind and solar power. The G-20 may be a powerful new forum within which to deal with these complex environmental issues, but if countries hope to truly make progress, leaders must make more concrete commitments to changing the behavior of their respective nations. The current global economic crisis certainly deserves primary focus at the moment, but given the propensity for continual change and upheaval on the international stage, the environment must be prioritized in order to ensure a bright future for all countries.