50th Anniversary of the US-Japan Security Treaty comes amid strains in the bilateral relationship

Ren Yi Hooi, BASC Research Assistant

The US-Japan security treaty turned 50 years old last month, but the bilateral relationship between these two countries currently faces a critical point as a result of several spats between the US and the new Hatoyama administration in Japan.

Although US President Barack Obama and Japanese PM Yukio Hatoyama share common goals and policies, including development in the Third World, measures to curb global warming and the prevention of nuclear proliferation, Hatoyama’s call for a “close and equal” Japan-US relationship since taking office has precipitated a rise in tension between the two countries.

Under the current treaty, the US is obliged to defend Japan in the case of an armed attack, but Japan is not obliged to defend America should the attack happen the other way around. Instead, the US is given access to facilities and areas in Japan "for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East." While this agreement yields both nations considerable benefit, its asymmetrical relationship has long been a cause of friction, and Hatoyama’s hope to see a “more equal alliance” has placed it under further strain.

More specifically, what Hatoyama wishes to see is a reduction in the “omoiyari” budget, the costs born by Japan for supporting the US forces here, and a revision of the Status of Forces Agreement governing the operation of the US military in Japan--issues which are not negotiable from the point of view of the US. The issue of the relocation of the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, in particular, has fueled dispute between the two countries over the last few months, and is currently still unsettled. Neither country wishes to give in to the other's demands, and it is difficult for either to push forward without incurring strong repercussions.

In addition, the US-Japan relationship is also seeing points of contention over non-security issues. Japan’s new incentives for eco-friendly cars, for example, have raised the ire of US auto-makers who found their cars largely excluded from Japan’s subsidy program. Despite the small volume of American cars exported to Japan, the US has been putting pressure on Japan to include more American cars in its environmental incentives, leading to a new potential cause for trade disputes between the two countries.

As the two nations review the past 50 years of their security relationship, their evaluations of the past will play a crucial role in determining the future direction of their alliance. While the US and Japan both agree that their partnership is indispensible and share hopes for it to be further deepened, the question of whether there is a change in the balance of power, and how the two countries react to it, will be the key factor that determines whether their alliance will be further strengthened or invevitably destabilized.

Little Prospects for Japan’s Proposed “East Asian Community”

Peter Volberding, BASC Research Assistant

Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s recent proposal for an East Asian Community is expected to raise eyebrows at Saturday’s trilateral summit in Beijing between the leaders of Japan, China, and South Korea. Inspired by the successes of the European Union, Hatoyama’s prosaic vision aims to foster economic growth and ensure regional stability. But calls for greater Asian integration are nothing new, and are rarely successful—is this proposal any different? Probably not.

What is different is Japan’s interest in regional affairs. The LDP’s half century stranglehold over Japanese politics relied on a close relationship with Washington, often at the expense of Beijing or Seoul. Prime Minister Hatoyama’s sudden shift in foreign policy reflects his desire to reassess Japan’s relations with its neighbors. His promise to not visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine and his proposal for an East Asian Community, for example, are important first attempts at increasing rapport in Japan’s relations with China and South Korea.

However, the East Asian Community seems to be more about self-interest rather than repentance. The DPJ faces a stagnant domestic economy, and sees increased economic cooperation as a means to increase Japan’s economic growth potential. While the party has certainly prioritized improved international relations, this aim is most likely ancillary to domestic economic goals.

In addition, as many Chinese scholars have eagerly emphasized, this proposal was actually first promoted in the early 1990s—and it became ASEAN + 3. Why has Japan proposed yet another grouping? Japan desires to check China’s growing regional influence. In fact, Japan’s proposed East Asian Community not only includes the ASEAN + 3 nations, but also Australia, New Zealand, and India. This "ASEAN+6" grouping has already been in existence since 2005 in the form of the East Asia Summit (EAS), whose meetings have thus far produced little more than broad statements about energy cooperation. Japan’s not-so-secret intentions to balance China in the EAS have thus far tempered Chinese interest in the grouping, and China will have the same reaction to any East Asian Community consisting of this larger "+6" format.

Finally, the East Asian Community will ironically force Japan to address sensitive domestic issues. For example, a new economic community would undoubtedly pressure Japan to liberalize trade, reduce domestic farm subsidies, and ease restrictions on foreign laborers. Given the heavily entrenched interests of industry and agriculture, I am skeptical that the Japanese government will revisit these policies anytime soon.

If the current problems of the EU are any indication, the East Asian Community faces little prospect of succeeding. Enormous economic and political heterogeneity in Asia preclude any semblance to the European integration model. Furthermore, historical distrust is routinely manifested in public protests against Japan, reducing the likelihood that the Chinese and South Korean governments would agree to increased integration in the near future, even if the plan were advantageous for all parties.

While economic integration in Asia is an admirable idea, the East Asian Community is not a viable option. Deep-seated political suspicions will thwart discussions, and Prime Minister Hatoyama will leave Beijing empty-handed.